of shareholders who look to a system of checks and balances to protect their interests. If we accept this argument, then we must also accept that each corporate governance system has within it social, economic, and cultural variations that play a greater or lesser role in how fl exible and accommodating those investors will be towards those who act as their economic agents.
With their shared common heritage and cultural traditions, the differences between the common law and civil law Western traditions are differences of form over substance. Nevertheless, it is the AngloAmerican model with some civil law characteristics that has assumed central position on the world's stock markets, with civil law characteristics particularly the adoption of stakeholder theory as a value system. The more interesting issue is whether China's social, cultural, and legal traditions will continue to infl uence the continuing developments in Chinese company law, or whether the evolution of China's corporate governance system must inevitably follow the Anglo-American system if it is to succeed on the terms of the international investor. China's Company Law and the corporate governance system currently in place owe more to the longstanding and deeply held Chinese values upholding the importance of fl exibility, resulting in tolerance for degrees of freedom in decision making depending upon the context. This has been described 3 as a system of "low structure, high ambiguity" in which the ambiguity itself allows for the context itself to determine what is fair. Chinese Company Law remains ambiguous and, on many important issues, fails to deal with the "who, what, where and how" of legislative drafting that we expect from the common and civil law systems. For the Western investor, therefore, the whole system appears to be legally 'defi cient' when compared with the detailed drafting techniques of, for example, the Hong Kong Companies Ordinance. 4 The problem is further complicated since there is no body of case law to supplement the gaps and no doctrine of precedent with which to predict outcomes and to comfort the investor with a sense of deeply held traditions of law, structure, and stability.
This chapter explores the value system captured by the current corporate governance mechanisms in place and the problem of "ambiguity" in China's Company Law. We see China's Company Law as highly fl exible and intentionally leaving space for agreement or discretion depending upon the context of the particular situation. The model is, therefore, in direct contrast to Western ideas of corporate governance in which the context of the law is intended to be neutral. The Chinese system assumes the merits of fl exibility and discretion. In contrast, the Western model assumes predictability with explicit remedies, stated exceptions to the
